Free Will of Terrorists and Moral Responsibility

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Abstract

This study compares the mental states of terrorists to those of psychopaths to investigate the moral responsibility of radicalized terrorists. It argues that persons who conduct premeditated crimes should bear greater moral responsibility than radicalized terrorists, due to their impaired sensitivity to understand social moral norms as social moral norms and distorted ideological frameworks. The study recognizes that radicalization distorts terrorists' perception of morality, similar to the prudential deficiencies seen in psychopaths. But unlike psychopaths, who are exonerated of moral responsibility due to their incapacity to understand morality, radicalized terrorists have moral frameworks that are functional despite being distorted by extremist narratives. Although radicalization can be a mitigating factor, the paper argues that terrorists who have undergone radicalization cannot completely avoid moral responsibility for their actions. The comparison with premeditated crimes and crimes of passion also highlights the extent of moral responsibility that terrorists should take on. The study indicates that while radicalization affects moral responsibility, it shouldn't be a complete defense. It also calls for a reevaluation of how terrorism is seen in judicial punishment.

1 Introduction

In recent decades, terrorist attacks triggered by various conflicts in pursuit of influencing governments have been one of the main factors that threaten national security. From the 2017 Barcelona Attack jihadist carried on La Rambla Street in Barcelona in the name of the "Islam regime" [1]and the 9/11 World Trade Center Attack on 2001[2], to eco-terrorists attacking the Superphénix nuclear power plant construction site in France in 1982[3], terrorism has been a factor

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[1]BBC News, (2017a), 'Spain Attacks: Terror Timeline', BBC News, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-40973439.

[2]Bergen, Peter L. "September 11 Attacks." Encyclopædia Britannica, Britannica, 2018, www.britannica.com/event/September-11-attacks.

[3]Prial, Frank J. (1982), "ANTI TANK ROCKETS ARE FIRED at FRENCH NUCLEAR REACTOR." The New York Times, January 20, 1982, sec. World. https://www.nytimes.com/1982/01/20/world/antitank-rockets-are-fired-at-french-nuclear-reactor.html.

disturbing public safety. As a result, the question of whether terrorists should be held morally responsible for their actions in order to deter future terrorist attacks and potential destruction of human rights or or if their reintegration into society should be facilitated at large is crucial.

This paper argues that terrorists who undergo radicalization should, due to their impaired sensitivity to societal norms, be held less morally responsible for their actions compared to those who commit premeditated crimes. By reviewing the current legal system, we tend to view terrorism as an aggravating factor in the sentencing process of the equivalent crimes. However, the paper suggests that radicalization should be a mitigating factor that holds radicalized terrorists less morally responsible.

This argument stems from observing the similarities and differences between the mental states of psychopaths and radicalized terrorists. I shall first clarify the definition of "psychopath" for better understanding in this paper, which will be used as a medical diagnosis, instead of the daily colloquial term that refers to anyone who breaks the law and has absolutely no sympathy towards the victims. "Psychopath" follows the definition of having prudential deficits resulting in their lack of sensitivity and understanding of moral rules.[4] Both psychopaths and radicalized terrorists are either not or less sensitive towards societal moral norms due to different reasons. This paper is also based on Watson's standpoint of not holding psychopaths morally responsible due to their characteristics mentioned in his paper Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits. Hence, I will further explore whether radicalized terrorists should not be held morally responsible due to a similar lack of sensitivity. Further, terrorists' social isolation is a result of the state of radicalization and their inability to understand moral rules as moral rules, which both exacerbate their insensitivity towards societal moral norms. To clarify, psychopaths and terrorists can understand moral rules themselves; however, their inability is in understanding them as moral rules — as having some special force, rather than simply being arbitrary rules imposed by others.

Therefore, in Part 1 Radicalization, I will first introduce a main characteristic and distinction of terrorists — radicalization — and compare the sensitivity and understanding of societal moral norms of terrorists in the state of radicalization with psychopaths. I will come to the conclusion that terrorists are not psychopaths, and this cannot be used as an excuse of the moral responsibility they should hold. In Part 2 Comparison with Other Crimes, I will compare the terrorist attacks with the crimes of passion and premeditated crimes conducted by ordinary people, and clarify to what extent the specialties of terrorists could serve as a mitigating factor for the moral responsibility that they should hold. In Part 3 Free Will and Moral Responsibility, I will use free will theories to explore one's sensitivity towards moral rules and the recognition of wrongdoings. Then, I will distinguish and evaluate how different factors can influence the degree of moral responsibility one shall be charged during the sentencing

[4]Watson, Gary (2013), 'XIV-Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 113 (3pt3): 269–92.

process.

To begin, it is important to clarify what is meant by "moral responsibility." In this context,moral responsibility refers to the degree in which people are held accountable for their actions. It takes into account the societal moral standards and entails the ability to act with understanding, control, and intentionality. People are assessed according to the degree to which they can act freely and rationally within a given context.[5]

2 Radicalization

Radicalization is the process of adopting extreme political, social, or religious beliefs that diverge greatly from the social norm. This process frequently results in the justification of using violence or unlawful approaches to further one's objectives. It entails a profound change in viewpoints, which frequently leads to a readiness to participate in or encourage terrorist activities. Radicalization creates an ideological framework of extreme narratives, which filter every piece of information terrorists take in from the outside world. This layer of "extreme narratives" sieves their understanding of the moral norms and changes their perception of the world. While each narrative reinforces one another, together the ideology network as a whole justified their actions.[6] This transition can be influenced by numerous factors, such as individual grievances, socio-economic conditions, political events, and exposure to extremist ideologies through social networks or online platforms.[7] In the documentary "Stranger: Talking to Jihadist" by the Chinese journalist Jing Chai, the radicalized jihadist misinterpreted the Islamic scriptures and Sharia Law only by its literally level due to their jihadist ideology. By understanding Sharia Law without an historical context and radicalized reasoning, they consider anyone who does not follow Sharia Law in a literal sense as a criminal. Indeed, the Sharia Law mentioned penalty such as hand chopping for stealing, crucifixion for robbery etc. "Hudud", the sins against god, refers to the punishments that existed in Sharia Law when corporal punishments were common in Middle Age. However, when modern Turkey and other countries abolished the corporal punishments and established a modern criminal procedure system, Jihadists used "Hudud" as a symbol of ideological purity to justify their terrorist acts.

Radicalized agents frequently present themselves as victims of a greater struggle or as being a part of a greater mission, such as establishing Islamic regime through global confrontation, using extremist narratives to frame personal grievances within a larger ideological context. Instead of focusing on one's own grievance, their terrorist attacks will be glorified as sacrificing their lives for establishing their independent regime that follows their religious law. This

[5]Talbert, Matthew (2019), 'Moral Responsibility', Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/

[6]Kees van den Bos, (2018), A Review of Radicalization Theories, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

[7]Kees van den Bos, (2018), A Review of Radicalization Theories, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

adoption frequently entails a "us versus them" mentality, in which people who disagree with them are viewed as adversaries. For instance, the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, or ISIS, frequently labeled themselves as "victims" that are being persecuted by Western powers and corrupt Muslim governments. While dehumanizing their enemies by referring to them by derogatory terms of "infidels" and "apostates," the propaganda further enhanced the process of radicalization of the followers. For jihadist, "Tawhid," or the oneness of God in Islam, is the core value and the basis of everything.[8] The numerous acts that fall under the category of "shirk," or idolatry, kept adherents living in constant terror of committing "shirk." These acts ranged from adding any human interpretation of the Qur'an to producing pictures and carving sculptures. Once the ideology is fully committed, anyone who disobeys their deity becomes the greatest criminal, which further justify the massacre they conducted.

Once they adopted the extremists' narratives and ideological commitment, the radicalization of terrorists would make them less sensitive to the social moral rules our society largely holds. Their social isolation will be exacerbated as they choose a value system that differs from society, as they often have to leave their original social circle, leave their family and friends, and only get in touch with the people in their ideological community. Similarly for psychopaths, the dysfunction in their brain – the chemical and neural pathways that are disrupted – causes them to both lack emotional engagement and lack sensitivity towards morality, which results in the inability to understand moral norms as moral norms. According to Watson's paper "Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits", [Wat13] psychopaths also possess "prudential deficits", which refers to their impaired ability to make decisions that are in their own long-term best interests. This results in the frequently displayed impulsivity and a concentration on instant gratification without taking future implications into consideration, which is evidenced by their incapacity to see the broader context and make responsible decisions.[9] Both characteristics of psychopaths are deeply rooted and interconnected, resulting in their inability to make responsible decisions based on their long-term interest and moral norms. This would result in a reduction of restrictive effects on one's behavior that moral norms serve. Therefore, psychopaths are excused from taking moral responsibility due to their intrinsic deficits.

A combination of empathy deficiencies, a failure to internalize ethical norms, and an inability to engage in genuine moral reasoning lead psychopaths to moral isolation. Their self-centered perspective further distances them from societal moral principles. Because they are unable to attach the moral feelings to moral standards that underlie human social interactions, psychopaths do not have the ability to understand rules as moral rules. This leads to a lack of moral responsibility and social alienation. Psychopaths are therefore unable to fully integrate into or be accepted by the moral community, leading to their moral

[8]The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica. 2009. "Tawhid — Islam." In Encyclopædia Britannica.

[9]Watson, Gary (2013), 'XIV-Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 113 (3pt3): 269–92.

and social alienation. Due to the ideological commitment and the adoption of extremist narratives, radicalized terrorists experience social isolation, as people outside their radicalized group do not understand their ideological framework and claims. Since the state of radicalization terrorists went through is also similar to the mental inability of psychopaths, the kind of social isolation terrorists experienced is similar to the moral isolation psychopathy experienced. Therefore, due to the radicalization of terrorists, it should serve as a mitigating factor in the sentencing process.

However, while radicalization can be a mitigating factor, it does not mean that terrorists can escape moral responsibility as psychopaths might. For a better understanding of the difference between the inability to understand moral rules and less sensitivity to societal moral rules: suppose a signal receiver in everyone's head is attempting to pick up the signals of actions. After judging the action by the ethical codes it learnt, a verdict signal would be transmitted back to instruct further actions. Most people have a clear signal from this receiver that directs their behavior through a constant flow of moral and social norms. For psychopaths, however, the receiver is broken. In the absence of instructional signals, psychopaths understand the moral rules as rules, but not as specifically moral rules. Because of this defect, they are unable to discern the frequency of moral norms, leading them to act in a way that defies the social and ethical norms that others naturally observe. However, for radicalized terrorists, their receivers are still working, but the signals they received might be distorted due to the distorted moral rules system they used to process the signals. The processors with distorted ideologies and narratives of radicalized terrorists will filter everything they received and judged according to their own belief system. This leaves them less sensitive to the societal moral rules, since their processors are working based on a distorted system or another system.

For psychopaths, since it is their congenital inability to understand moral norms, it would be unfair to hold them to the same standard of moral responsibility as the non-psychopathic individuals. Thus, in Watson's paper "Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits", [Wat13] he concludes that psychopaths should not be held morally responsible.[10] However, the distorted signals could not excuse radicalized terrorists from being morally responsible for their actions. As the analogy illustrated, radicalized terrorists are not psychopaths. Their moral rules receivers are functioning. They are not just functioning, they need to be extremely sensitive for terrorists to be convinced by extremist narratives and radicalized in the first place. Since ideologies themselves involve moral claims, one would not be convinced by a Jihadist ideology of pure Islamic regime without a high sensitivity towards the Islamic moral rules. As the process of radicalization would require a high sensitivity towards ideologies and extremists' narratives, the terrorists' receivers are capable of functioning well. The difference between ordinary people and radicalized terrorists is the moral rules system that they are sensitive to. Due to the distorted moral norms

[10]Watson, Gary (2013), 'XIV-Psychopathic Agency and Prudential Deficits', Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society (Hardback) 113 (3pt3): 269–92.

system the radicalized terrorists are following, they should hold less moral responsibility since they are not intended or not aware of not obeying the societal moral norms that are widely held.

Manwar Ali, previously a radicalized jihadist, has undergone a significant transformation and is now a committed peace activist. Once deeply rooted in radical ideas, Ali was driven by a belief in a distorted interpretation of Islamic teachings that justified violence to actively engage in violent jihad. He engaged in conflicts and promoted radical ideas because he held the conviction that armed struggle is a legitimate way of achieving political and religious goals. He realized that the violent approach jihadist took was wrong after a process of self-reflection and revelation of his faith. By recognizing the values of compassion, peace, and sympathy, he enhanced the understanding of Islamic beliefs. He realized there was a contradiction between his previous behavior and the fundamental principles of Islam after considering the ethical and moral impacts of violence and witnessing its catastrophic consequences. Through interacting with a variety of viewpoints and looking for guidance from decent scholars, Ali came to understand jihad in a nonviolent way. After going through a process of transformation, he decided to dedicate himself to promoting harmony and understanding within his faith and fighting against extremism. This led him to adopt a dedication to peace and reconciliation.

In a TED speech "Inside the Mind of a Former Radical Jihadist" [Ali16] he used to give, Ali mentioned that, "I had deep concerns for the suffering of others, and a strong desire to help and bring relief to them. I thought violent jihad was noble, chivalrous, and the best way to help."[11] His speech clearly reflects that even in a radicalized state, Ali maintained sensitivity towards moral rules and empathy for others. However, his sensitivity towards moral rules is heavily distorted by a radicalized Muslim ideology that skewed his perception of what was right and wrong. His limited and radical understanding of Islamic beliefs led him to believe that his acts, including using violence, were morally justified in the sake of defending Muslims regime and enforcing justice.

Hence, radicalized terrorists are often motivated by a strong sense of ideological commitment, which they use to justify using violence as legitimate and necessary to achieve greater political or social objectives. They frequently operate through social networks that support their convictions and provide them a feeling of self and direction. On the other hand, psychopaths' violent tendencies are usually not motivated by ideology; rather, they are driven largely by thrill-seeking, personal gain, or a desire for control. It is obvious that radicalized terrorists are not psychopaths. Despite the similarities radicalized terrorists and psychopaths share, their different sensitivity and understanding of moral rules would not excuse radicalized terrorists from holding moral responsibility. The fundamental difference between the decision-making mechanism determined that even terrorists are in an radicalized state — though it can serve as an mitigating factor — they are not excused to be held not morally responsible.

[11] Ali, Manwar. 2016. "Inside the Mind of a Former Radical Jihadist." TED. October 20, 2016.

3 Comparison with Other Crimes

Based on Part I, since radicalized terrorists should still be charged with moral responsibility, the main focus of Part II would be the reasoning of to which degree radicalized terrorists should be charged. Considering the current legal position which any terrorism-related crimes are penalized more heavily than both premeditated crimes and crimes of passion, Part II argues that radicalized terrorists should be charged morally responsible to a degree heavier than crimes of passion, and more lenient penalties compared to premeditated crimes.

The most significant difference between crimes of passion and premeditated crime is the presence of time and space for moral reasoning. One's capacity to govern their behavior in accordance with their underlying values and sense of good and wrong, is strongly based on the existence of time and space for moral reasoning. For crimes of passion, this capacity is weakened by an intense emotional rush, which would diminish one's ability to control their actions according to the moral norms they hold. Premeditated crimes, on the other hand, demonstrate an obvious and intentional violation for moral rules as they show that the person has considered their actions, acknowledged the moral ramifications, and yet choose to conduct the crime. Therefore, because they act with clarity of mind and deliberate endorsement of their wrongdoings, premeditated offenders are viewed as more morally responsible.

For further explanation and distinction, the free will theory of Frankfurt will be involved, for which the following definitions will need to be clarified:

1. "First-order desires" are simply desires to do or not to do something.

2. "Second-order desires" are desires about which first-order desire to have and to act on.

3. "Volitional alignment" refers to the alignment between the desire one acts on and one's higher-order volitions (second-order desires).

In premeditated crimes, there will still be two circumstances: full commitment to higher-order desire and non-existence of volitional alignment. The full commitment to higher-order desire crime entails a criminal's first-order desire — the desire to commit the crime — and second-order volitions — the endorsement of that desire — aligning with each other. Without doubt, this would receive the heaviest punishment, as this alignment completely reflects a clear and deliberate disobedience of moral laws. Therefore, premeditated offenders will face the harshest punishment because they willfully embrace their wrongdoings and act with clarity of mind. For the second circumstance, they may be enslaved by their first-order desire, or even after weighing and balancing between moral norms and the illegal acts. This means that though they neither not consider the crime is the right thing to do, nor think they should act according to their first-order desire. However, they could not reject the seduction and finally committed the crime. For instance, when a few criminals robbed a bank, most of them are starving to death which they desperately need an amount of money to survive; however, at the same time, since they do not consider robbery as the right thing to do, they have a second-order desire to not desire to conduct the crime. However, because they are driven by their strong sense of first-order de-

sire, they may still conduct the crime by only obeying their greediness and desire for the money. Therefore, crimes without the existence of volitional alignment will receive less moral responsibility.

Going down the punishment scale, crime of passion lies under both circumstances of premeditated crimes. In crimes of passion, offenders are motivated by intense first-order desires, which are momentarily stronger than an individual's ability to apply reasoning to uphold ethical norms. This emotional rush either does not leave time for consideration or impairs their ability to generate and act upon second-order desires, which typically guide their behavior in accordance with their underlying beliefs and sense of right and wrong. Therefore, without the involvement of second-order desire, crimes of passion should receive more lenient punishment than premeditated crimes.

Terrorist attacks — usually prepared for years — belong to premeditated crimes. However, from the perspective of first-order and second-order desire, radicalized terrorists can be charged less morally responsible than premeditated crimes. The moral distinction between radicalized terrorists and individuals who commit premeditated crimes involves a complex distinction of their respective moral responsibilities. Both may entail second-order volition, in which people deliberately match their desires with their acts, but their understanding of moral rules and motivations are significantly distinct. Extremist ideologies that pervert morality and legitimize violence as a way of achieving ideological goals are typically held by terrorists. Because they act in line with what they regard as a higher moral imperative, this ideological framework might impair their judgment and lessen their moral responsibility.

In the documentary "Strangers: Talking to Jihadists," the brutal reality of extremist ideology is starkly illustrated through an interview conducted by journalist Chai Jing with Farid Benyetto, a former Jihadist recruiter. When Chai Jing asked Benyetto directly if he would kill her since she is a woman, he hesitated before responding, "Unfortunately, yes." He explained his motivation to carry out such a deed by claiming it on a religious belief system that denies the humanity of women. His former assertion that "theologically, your species (women) doesn't exist" shows a deeply rooted extreme islam view that regards women as inferior to men and excludes them from the moral attention accorded to other humans.[12] This incident highlights a crucial moral responsibility divide between those who commit premeditated crimes and radicalized terrorists. Radicalized terrorists, driven by twisted ideological narratives, see their conduct as legitimate within the context of their beliefs. Premeditated criminals, on the other hand, intentionally violate well-recognized moral norms even while they are aware of their wrongness. Although both may entail second-order volition — alignment of one's behavior with one's own beliefs — radicalized terrorists' ethical responsibility is mitigated by their adherence to a distorted ideology.

Radicalized terrorists should be charged more morally responsible than crimes of passion. Since for the majority of crimes of passion, people are driven by a

[12] Jing, Chai "Stranger: Talking to Jihadists" YouTube, February 10, 2024, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4Rznb378pI.

strong emotional rush, which mainly first-order desire temporarily blocks the part of the restriction due to one's understanding of moral rules. While radicalized terrorist attacks still involve the higher-order volition and the volitional alignment, the engagement of higher-order volition indicates a deeper sense of ownership and willingness over one's action. As Frankfurt mentioned in his passage "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility", [Fra69] the principle of holding one morally responsible would follow "a person is not morally responsible for what he has done if he did it only because he could not have done otherwise."[13] Therefore, the conduction of an action would require the alignment of higher-order volition with their actual action. It addresses the difference between their desire and will. While desire is a thought that comes in a flash, a will is the force that drives the agent to activate the real action. Therefore, in the circumstances of terrorists' higher-order volition is in line with their actual behaviors of conducting terrorist attacks, theoretically they should be held morally responsible.[14] However, by comparing premeditated crimes, radicalized terrorists who act in line with values they considered correct under their distorted ideology, would excuse them from taking as much as moral responsibility with those premeditated criminals, which conduct crime even after careful consideration and clarity of knowing the wrongness of their act.

4 Free Will and Moral Responsibility

When evaluating the degree of moral responsibility, it is crucial to consider various aspects, including the scale of societal damage, the terrorists' sensitivity towards moral rules, the alignment of higher-order desires during the attack, the recognition of wrongdoing, and the content of the radical ideology adopted. This paper aims to point out the aspects of the sensitivity towards moral rules of terrorists and the recognition of wrongdoing, in which the standards of sentencing could be renewed.

Some might argue that, given the catastrophic damage and impact most terrorist attacks have on our society, terrorists should not be held less morally responsible. For instance, the most serious charges would be related to Adolf Hitler's atrocities, especially the unparalleled massacre committed during the Holocaust. Hitler was undoubtedly in a state of radicalization when examining the core values of Nazism, which were based on racial purity, extreme nationalism, the supremacy of the Aryan race, and anti-Semitism.[15] Critics might contend that my argument—considering radicalization as a mitigating factor for moral responsibility—would absolve Hitler of his sins. However, this is not the case. Hitler would still bear the moral responsibility for his actions because the sentencing process considers multiple variables, including the extent of the

[13] Frankfurt, Harry G (1969), "Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility." The Journal of Philosophy 66 (23): 829–39.

[14] Frankfurt, Harry G (1971), "Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a Person." The Journal of Philosophy 68 (1): 5–20.

[15] Holborn, Hajo (1964), Origins and Political Character of Nazi Ideology, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

damage caused. Given the massive scale of the genocide, the mitigating factor of radicalization would have little to no effect on the charge of his moral responsibility.

By emphasizing the catastrophic damage terrorist attacks brought to society, it is solely considering the scale of impact of certain acts. No matter because of what reasons, one should be held morally responsible for the damage they brought. However, this paper is trying to argue that in the sentencing process of radicalized terrorists, "terrorism" should be a mitigating factor, instead of an aggravating factor under equivalent crimes. Due to their impaired sensitivity towards societal moral norms and distorted ideology that lead them to consider what they are doing is right, they shall be held less morally responsible than premeditated crimes.

5 Conclusion

This paper focuses on discovering the moral responsibility radicalized terrorists should hold, and the degree of charging them. Firstly, by comparing them to psychopaths, they are not psychopaths, which leaves them morally responsible. However, their radicalization states do share similarities with psychopaths, which make "radicalization" a mitigating factor in the sentencing process. Secondly, by considering the preparation process of terrorist attacks, it is apparent that terrorist attacks are premeditated crimes, which will make them more morally responsible than crimes of passion. However, due to their distorted ideology, it made them less morally responsible than other kinds of premeditated crimes, as there is not any clear disobedience in the moral rules they consider correct.

As I was writing this paper, I also recognized another factor that is worth exploring about — whether the content of the ideology when an agent adopted to be radicalized could be a mitigating factor when considering the degree of moral responsibility one shall be charged. It seems like a less dehumanized ideology that radicalized people may be charged less morally responsible. However, further study about the content is still needed to reach a final conclusion.

I recognize that radicalization can occur as disadvantaged groups or those with strong religious beliefs struggle to reintegrate into mainstream society amid rapid social changes. Under today's legal system, however, criminal law is harsher if the same offense is committed by a terrorist. This undoubtedly makes it more difficult for terrorists to reinterpret and integrate into mainstream society. Treating radicalization as a mitigating factor may result in a perception of leniency, which could jeopardize public safety if rehabilitation efforts are unsuccessful. However, successfully addressing the root causes of radicalization can lead to long-term reductions in extremist violence, enhancing public safety. Reintegrated terrorists, who are more familiar with terrorist organizations, may also be able to offer valuable insights to authorities on addressing safety issues. Accepting radicalization as a mitigating factor aligns with human rights and dignity values, highlighting the potential for personal growth and transforma-

tion. Providing appropriate moral responsibility and support for vulnerable groups to reintegrate, rather than excluding them, can build a more secure national and international peace and establish an open, inclusive societal culture. More significantly, rehabilitating and reintegrating former extremists can lessen societal differences and promote social cohesion, leading to a more resilient and inclusive community.

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