Free Will of Terrorists and Moral Responsibility

Abstract

This study compares the mental states of terrorists to those of psychopaths to investigate the moral responsibility of radicalized terrorists. It argues that persons who conduct premeditated crimes should bear greater moral responsibility than radicalized terrorists, due to their impaired sensitivity to understand social moral norms as social moral norms and distorted ideological frameworks. The study recognizes that radicalization distorts terrorists’ perception of morality, similar to the prudential deficiencies seen in psychopaths. But unlike psychopaths, who are exonerated of moral responsibility due to their incapacity to understand morality, radicalized terrorists have moral frameworks that are functional despite being distorted by extremist narratives. Although radicalization can be a mitigating factor, the paper argues that terrorists who have undergone radicalization cannot completely avoid moral responsibility for their actions. The comparison with premeditated crimes and crimes of passion also highlights the extent of moral responsibility that terrorists should take on. The study indicates that while radicalization affects moral responsibility, it shouldn’t be a complete defense. It also calls for a reevaluation of how terrorism is seen in judicial punishment.