The West’s Failed Foreign Policy Towards Libya

Abstract

From 1969-2011, Libya was ruled by Muammar Al-Gaddafi and after the Arab Spring of 2011, what started as peaceful protests soon turned into a widespread civil war. In response to this, the UN decided that NATO must intervene to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe. While most scholars agree that NATO acted within the legal guidelines set forth in UN Resolution 1973, which gave NATO the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) civilians with the use of military force, others conclude there was a blurred line between the responsibility to protect civilians and activities that go well beyond that, such as regime change. This paper will argue that it was short-sighted for the US and its allies to intervene so quickly in Libya’s civil war. Not only was the intervention a misinterpretation of international law, but it also had several resulting effects; it resulted in unnecessary civilian casualties, it brought more instability in Libya, and it introduced war crimes committed by the coalition-backed rebels. Ultimately, Gaddafi’s demise laid the roots for the Second Libyan Civil War and even more civilian deaths throughout Libya.